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This paper shows that an open economy Solow model provides a good
description of international investment positions in industrialized countries.
More than half of the variation of net foreign assets in the 1990's can be
attributed to cross country dierences in the savings rate, population and
productivity growth. Furthermore, these factors seem to be an important
channel through which output and wealth aect international investment po-
sitions.
We interpret this nding as evidence that decreasing returns are an im-
portant source of international capital movements. The savings rate (and
population growth) inuence the composition of country portfolios through
their downward (upward) pressure on the marginal productivity of capital.
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11 Introduction
International trade in assets allows capital to nd its way to the most productive
locations, thereby promoting an ecient allocation of capital. This is, apart from
risk sharing, the main motivation for the global integration of capital markets. In
this paper we analyze to what extent actual net foreign investment positions can
be explained by dierences in the productivity of capital that would exist if capital
movements were restricted.
Dierences in the marginal productivity of capital are inherently linked to de-
creasing returns to capital. In an autarkic economy with decreasing returns, the long
run productivity of capital is lower the more capital it accumulates per eciency
unit of labor. In an open economy, the (risk adjusted) return to capital should be
equal across countries. Therefore, (i) dierences in savings and (ii) dierences in the
growth rate of eciency units of labor lead to nonzero net foreign asset (NFA) posi-
tions, tending to equalize the returns to capital across countries. An open economy
version of the standard Solow model provides a framework to analyze international
investment positions in which both factors are incorporated.
We test the predictions of the model using a dataset of 21 industrialized countries.
For the last 20 years, the model provides a very good description of net foreign asset
positions both across countries and over time. In the 1990's the model explains more
than 50% of the variation across countries. Hence, decreasing returns to capital
are an important source of dierences in the return to capital that lead to foreign
investments. We interpret this nding as evidence that the global integration of
capital and goods markets improves the allocation of capital substantially.
A recent strand of literature analyzes the behavior of stocks of net foreign asset
positions. The most robust nding is that richer countries tend to have higher
external assets. Kraay, Loayza, Serven and Ventura (2000) nd a strong positive
relationship between nancial wealth and the net foreign asset position. Moreover,
2variations in wealth explain most of the variation in net foreign assets. Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2001b) show that GDP has a strong positive impact on long run
international investment positions. In their regressions, a country's relative output
per capita is the only explanatory variable that is highly signicant throughout all
specications for industrialized countries.
The (heuristic) approach of the literature has diculties in explaining the be-
havior of NFA in a few big countries, most importantly the U.S. Although being a
country with high output per capita, and also considerable nancial wealth, the U.S.
has been a net debtor for almost 20 years. Our approach provides an explanation
for this observation. The reason is that there are two dierent sources why some
countries are richer than others. If high output (and therefore wealth) is the result
of high savings - as stressed by Solow (1956) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992),
countries tend to have positive NFA. In contrast, if population and productivity
growth is the dominating source of growth, the resulting increase of the marginal
productivity of capital will ceteris paribus lead to negative NFA. This reasoning is
conrmed by our empirical results. The savings rate and the population growth rate,
both measured relative to the world average, capture much of the eect previously
attributed to GDP or nancial wealth.
A further branch of related literature attempts to explain capital ows. The
intertemporal approach to the current account leads to the view that an increase
savings should be fully invested abroad, i.e. increase the country's current account
one-to-one. However, since Feldstein and Horioka (1980) it is well documented that
the correlation between savings and current accounts is much lower. In a series of
papers Kraay and Ventura argue, that in the long run the marginal unit of wealth
is invested as the average one. In other words, savings are invested abroad in the
same proportion in which existing wealth is already invested abroad. The authors
provide a theoretical foundation of this "new rule". If decreasing returns to capital
are weak compared to investment risk, optimal portfolio choice implies that investors
3follow the new rule. In their model, the amount of savings determines the growth
of the country portfolio while the composition of the portfolio is determined by risk
characteristics of dierent countries.
The open economy Solow model provides an additional theoretical foundation of
the empirical ndings of Kraay and Ventura (2000). Although decreasing returns
play a crucial role in the model, it predicts that current accounts follow the "new
rule" in the long run. Hence, a cross country correlation of one between the current
account and the savings rate multiplied by the share of net foreign assets in total
wealth is not sucient to assess the presence or absence of decreasing returns to
capital.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briey set up the open economy
Solow model. We analyze to what extent the time series variation of net foreign asset
positions can be explained by the model in section 3. In section 4 we turn to the
cross country evidence and section 6 concludes.
2 An Open Economy Solow Model
2.1 The Model
We consider a collection of small open economies. In each economy, there is a large
number of rms that has access to the same constant returns to scale production
technology that transforms capital and labor into a homogenous nal good. Output
is tradable across countries and capital is mobile at no cost. Countries dier with
respect to their exogenous savings rates and their growth rates of eciency units of
labor.
Capital mobility guarantees that the interest rate equalizes across countries. We
consider a deterministic framework, i.e. rms do not face production risk. Therefore,
the interest rate corresponds to the marginal return to capital less the depreciation
4rate. This assumption implies, that all assets are perfect substitutes and gross
foreign asset positions are not determined. Only net foreign assets are determined
by dierences between asset supply of rms (investments) and asset demand of
households (savings).
Let Kj be the stock of physical capital in country j, and let Hj be the e-
ciency units of labor employed in country j. Gross domestic product in economy j
is produced according to a standard Cobb-Douglas production function (see equa-
tion 2.1). All variables except for the savings rates and the exogenous growth rates
are time variant. To simplify notation, time indices are dropped. Denote by r the
world rate of return to capital and by wj the wage in country j. The representative
agent in economy j has wealth Aj, which can be decomposed into domestic phys-
ical capital Kj and his net foreign asset position Fj. His income consists of labor
income generated in his home country, and of capital income. Equation 2.2 denes
the gross national product ~ Yj and its decomposition into gross domestic product Yj






~ Yj = rAj + wjHj = Yj + rFj (2.2)
Agent j saves a constant fraction sj of his income ~ Yj. He has to cover the
depreciation of his assets out of his savings. The physical depreciation rate is . The
exogenous growth rate of eciency units of labor is gj, capturing both exogenous
population and productivity growth. Denote by kj;aj;fj; ~ yj and yj the respective
variables normalized by eciency units, e.g. kj = Kj=Hj. As in the closed Solow
model, the dynamics towards steady state can be described by:
_ aj = _ kj + _ fj = sj(yj + rfj)   ( + gj)(kj + fj): (2.3)
Lower case variables without country index denote world averages and upper case
variables without country index denote world aggregates. Since capital is mobile,
5the marginal productivity of capital in every country corresponds the world interest
rate. This implies that the capital intensity kj equals the world average k. This has
to be true in every period, such that the time derivative has to be equal as well,
_ kj = _ k. With the simple Cobb Douglas production function, the global production
intensity is y = k. The evolution of the world capital intensity k depends on world
averages. Since the world as a whole is a closed economy at every point of time,
a  k, we have:
_ a = _ k = sy   ( + g)k: (2.4)
Details on aggregation are described in appendix A. The world savings rate s
corresponds to the average country savings-rates, weighted by ~ Yj=Y . Furthermore,
the world growth rate g equals the average country growth rates, weighted by the
relative eciency units of labor, Hj=H. The world average growth rate will therefore
converge to the growth rate of the fastest growing country in the very long run. The
average savings rate will increase as long as countries accumulate foreign assets on
their way to the steady state. This eect is due to the fact that the weight of high-
savings countries increases until they reach the steady state ratio of GNP to world
output.
Using _ kj = _ k, equations 2.4 and 2.3 simplify to an equation that describes the
evolution of the net foreign asset position.1 Using r = k 1 one obtains:
_ fj = (sj   s)y   (gj   g)k +
 
sjk
 1   (gj + )

fj: (2.5)
This equation says that in every period, one feeds the net foreign asset position out
of excess savings that nd no productive investment in country j. It is convenient
to normalize the net foreign asset positions over the domestic capital stock. We
therefore rewrite equation 2.5 using equation 2.4 in order to obtain equation 2.6.
1Equations 2.5 and 2.4 dene a (block recursive) system of dierential equations in fk;fjg.
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k) + (gj   g).2 In both equations k=y is determined by
equation 2.4 as in the closed economy Solow model. The sign of the net foreign
asset positions are solely determined by the savings rate and the growth rate of
eciency units of labor. The last term in equation 2.7 determines whether country
j is a creditor or a debtor. Whenever the savings rate is high enough compared to
the world average and corrected for dierences in the (exogenous) growth rate, a
country invests abroad. The rst term is a "multiplier" that is determined by the
dierence between marginal and average productivity.
2.2 A Permanent Increase in Savings and Productivity
Growth
We now turn to some comparative statics exercises. First, we discuss the behavior
of wealth, capital, and net foreign asset positions after a permanent increase in the
savings rate. We assume for simplicity, that the country is small enough such that
the increase in its savings rate does not aect the world average savings rate and
that the country starts in a steady state.
In the basic open economy Solow model, an increase in the savings rate does not
aect the capital to output ratio since all additional savings are invested abroad.
The ratio of net foreign assets over output increases until the increased depreciation
(and repartition due to exogenous growth) osets the capital ows. The ratio of
2Note that j > 0 for values of sj and gj that are suciently close to the world average rates
s and g, respectively. This ensures the existence of a steady state in which net foreign assets are
growing as fast as output and capital.
7wealth to output, being just the sum of the capital to output ratio and the ratio of
net foreign assets over output, increases as well. The Solow model therefore predicts
a strong positive relation between the wealth to output ratio a
y and ratio of net
foreign assets to capital
f
k.
The increase of the net foreign assets due to a permanent increase in the savings
rate takes place at a decreasing rate (see Figure 1). This is a direct consequence
of decreasing returns to capital. The intuition can be best described in two steps:
(i) Consider a country that is identical to the world average (sj = s;gj = g) but
has nonzero net foreign assets. The capital intensity of this economy grows at rate
sk 1   g   , which depends - among other things - on the average return to
capital y=k = k 1. The growth rate of the net foreign assets is sr   g    and
depends on the marginal return to capital, r. Since the marginal return is lower
than the average return, the ratio
f
k decreases over time. The country continuously
eats up its stock of foreign wealth. (ii) A country with permanently higher than
average savings will accumulate net foreign assets over time. However, the more
assets already accumulated, the more important is the "eating-up" component. In a
steady state, both eects cancel and the net foreign assets over output ratio remains
constant.
Let us now turn to the eects of a change in the growth rate. A permanent
increase in the exogenous growth rate has an eect that is qualitatively and quanti-
tatively opposite to an increase in the savings rate. Again, we assume for simplicity
that the country is small enough such that we can treat the world average growth
rate as exogenous and independent of the country's growth rate.
In a closed economy, a increase in productivity growth would ceteris paribus
lead to an increase in the marginal productivity of capital and thus the interest
rate. In an open economy, foreign capital inows will oset the upward pressure on
the interest rate. Whereas the capital to output ratio remains stable, the wealth to
output ratio decreases. Therefore, the Solow model predicts that a decrease in net























Figure 1: Evolution of NFA/capital after a permanent
increase in savings. Simulation for sj = s =
0:25,  + gj =  + g = 0:06 and  = 0:33
for the rst ten periods and sj = 0:26 after-
wards.
foreign assets comes along with a decrease in the wealth to output ratio.
Similar to the previous case, the decrease in net foreign assets takes place at a
decreasing rate. The externality of foreign owned capital on domestic labor produc-
tivity leads to an average return to wealth that is higher than the average return
to capital. In other words, since foreign capital is remunerated with the marginal
return to capital, the average return to domestically owned capital (=wealth) is
higher than the average return to total capital. A constant fraction of income is
saved such that wealth increases faster than capital, ceteris paribus. This, in turn,
implies that net foreign assets (debt) accumulate at a lower rate than capital and
output.
Quantitatively, the predictions of the open economy Solow model are almost
identical to the standard closed economy model. One can show that the speed of
convergence for an average country is given by  = (1 )(+g), which corresponds
to the speed of convergence of a closed economy with growth rate g. Calibrating the
9model such that  +gj =  +g = 0:06 and  = 0:33 yields  = 0:04 (see Mankiw et
al. (1992) for a discussion). This implies that it takes the economy about 17 years to
get halfway to the steady state. This can also be seen in gure 1. Given that major
capital market liberalizations took place in the 1980's and 1990's it is unlikely that
the capital markets are already close to steady state.
2.3 Decreasing Returns and Current Accounts
A potentially important consequence of decreasing returns is that the cross country
correlation between savings and current accounts is not equal to one. The current
account is given by CAj = _ Fj +Fj. In the steady state it must hold that _ Fj = Fjgj
in order to keep the ratio of net foreign assets to wealth (or output) constant. Using












In the long run, the unique role of savings is to foster portfolio growth. The com-
position of country portfolios, Fj=Aj, remains unchanged. Thus, the model predicts
that international capital ows follow the "new rule" (Kraay and Ventura, 2000) in
the long run. A cross country correlation of 1 between current accounts and savings
multiplied by
Fj
Aj is not sucient to assess the presence or absence of decreasing re-
turns to capital. It is therefore important to estimate directly the impact of savings,
population and productivity growth on country portfolios.
103 Time Series Evidence
3.1 Data and Specication
Is the Solow model suited to describe the actual behavior of net foreign asset po-
sitions over time? We want to investigate whether countries that experience an
increase in their savings rates or a decrease in population or productivity growth
accumulate more net foreign assets.
We use data for 21 industrialized countries. Due to the reunication in 1990
(structural break), we exclude Germany in the dynamic regressions such that there
are 20 countries left. The data for the savings rates and for population are taken
from the Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2002). The world savings
rate s and the world population growth rate is calculated as a average of all countries
in the sample, weighted by the countries' gross national products and population,
respectively.
Data on international investment positions, population and capital stocks are
taken from Kraay et al. (2000). They are available from 1966 to 1997. As for total
factor productivity, we adopt the usual approach to construct the Solow residual.3
However, the employment data (OECD Labour Force Statistics) necessary to con-
struct the residual are not available for all countries for all time periods. In the
1970's, we have data for only 14 out of the 20 countries.
Major capital market liberalizations took place in the 1980's and even 1990's.
For example, the principle of full freedom of capital movements was incorporated in
3The Solow residual is the annual growth rate of GDP in constant 1990 U.S dollars (at PPP),
less the share of wages in GDP times the growth rate of total civilian employment, less one minus
this share times the gorwth rate of the gross domestic capital stock as constructed by Kraay et al.
(2000) (which is also 1990 constant U.S. dollars at PPP). The share of wages in GDP is measured
as average over the sample period (1966-1997) of compensation of employees divided by GDP. The
data are taken from OECD Labour Force Statistics, OECD National Accounts and the IFS (IMF).
11European law only with the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union on
November 1, 1993. Most of the European countries, however, were forced to liberal-
ize capital markets until July 1990. Transitional arrangements were introduced for
Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland.4 In order to account for potential restrictions
to capital movements at the beginning of the sample period, we consider not only
the whole sample period, but also the second half separately, starting in 1982.
Our basic specication in this section is a dynamic panel with xed eects. As
endogenous variable we use a country's net foreign asset position normalized over












+ a1(sj;t   st) + a2(gj;t   gt) + "j + j;t; (3.1)
where gj = (gL
j ;gA
j ) is a vector containing the population growth rate gL
j and the
productivity growth rate gA
j , and g = (gL;gA) is a vector containing the respective
average values. " is a country specic xed eect and  the usual error term.
The motivation for choosing regression equation 3.1 is twofold. First, it can be
easily derived from equations 2.6. In theory, the coecient on the lagged dependent
variable varies over time and across countries, with j =  (sjr s
y
k)+(gj g). Simple
calibration of the term reveals that dierences are small compared to the average
value and unlikely to be distinguishable in an empirical analysis. For simplicity, we
therefore impose the restriction that j is constant across countries and over time.
The second motivation for choosing regression equation 2.6 is empirical. In the
most simple model as presented above, the capital to output ratio is independent
of country specic parameters. In the data, however, we observe that the capital to
output ratio varies over time and across countries. Normalizing over capital allows
to assess whether net foreign positions react more strongly than domestic capital to
an increase in savings and population or productivity growth.
4Most of these countries were allowed to maintain restrictions until December 31, 1992. An
extension not exceeding three years was granted to Portugal and Greece: the latter availed itself of
this possibility up to May 16, 1994. (see http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l25001.htm).
12In a panel with xed eects, a lagged dependent variable violates the strict
exogeneity assumption. Therefore we use the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator
that involves rst dierencing of the model in order to remove xed eects. The
dierenced equation is estimated, the lagged dependent variable is instrumented
with lags of the variable in levels.
We report three specications. The rst one (benchmark) includes only the
savings and population growth rates as exogenous variables. In the second speci-
cation we include the growth rate of total factor productivity. We nally include
other variables that could be potentially important in explaining international in-
vestment positions. We repeat the regressions for all three specications using the
second half of the sample period only.
3.2 Results
The rst and the fourth column of Table 1 report the results for the benchmark re-
gression. Three aspects of the results support the Solow model. First, the coecient
of savings is positive and highly signicant. Moreover, its magnitude is astonish-
ingly close to what is predicted by the theory. One would expect a coecient that
is equal to the inverse of the capital output ratio. In fact, in the second sub-sample,
i.e. the period after 1982, the coecient is roughly one third. For the total sam-
ple, the coecient is slightly smaller. Second, the coecient on population growth
is negative. In the second sub-sample, it is signicantly dierent from zero and it
cannot be rejected that it is dierent from minus one. Third, and perhaps most
important, the coecient on the lagged dependent variable is signicantly smaller
than one and very close to the value predicted by the Solow model. Following the
calibration of Mankiw et al. (1992), i.e.  = 0:33 and choosing savings s = 0:25 and
the capital output ratio K
Y = 3, one would expect a coecient of roughly 0.94 for
the average country.













t 1 0.92 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.88 0.90
(72.03) (56.34) (56.23) (48.09) (41.78) (38.49)
sj   s 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.35 0.35 0.4
(13.34) (9.47) (11.99) (11.16) (7.01) (11.36)
gL
j   gL -0.01 -0.05 -0.23 -0.74 -0.24 -0.57
(-0.31) (-1.76) (-1.53) (-2.94) (-0.97) (-2.22)
gA
j   gA -0.01 -0.01
(-1.35) (-0.09)
Public Debt -0.001 0.01
(-0.13) (1.44)
Gov. Exp. -0.001 0.0004
(-0.89) (2.09)
log( A







long run: (sj   s) 2.88 2.27 2.60 3.89 2.92 4
Sargan. Pr > 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Obs. 517 370 462 300 223 300
Table 1: Time Series Estimation Results. Arellano Bond estimator for dynamic
panel with xed eects. The samples are (slightly) unbalanced. Germany
has been excluded due to a structural break in 1990. t-statistics are in
parenthesis and italics. The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions
(results from 2-step GMM with standard errors not corrected for het-
eroscedasticity.)with "H0 : The over-identifying restrictions are valid.".
14foreign asset position can be calculated by dividing the respective coecients by
one minus the coecient of the lagged dependent variable. The implied long run
coecient on savings is therefore 2.8 for the whole period and 3.9 for the period
between 1982 and 1997. Both coecients are highly signicant. However, they are
still smaller than the calibrated value, which would be between 5 and 6. A possible
explanation for this nding is the low speed of convergence. Especially in the second
sample the estimation period of 15 years is not even sucient to go half way to the
steady state. As one can see in Figure 1 (and as discussed in section 2), standard
parameter values imply that it takes 17 years to halve the distance to the steady
state. A second explanation would be the role of non-tradeable goods as discussed
below.
Introducing TFP growth in our second specication as further explanatory vari-
able has little eect. The variable is insignicant and almost zero. This is not
extremely surprising, given that the data are constructed in a complicated way.
The measure itself is highly volatile on a year to year basis and the number of
observations is reduced substantially.
In the third specication we introduce variables that are related to (i) scal
policy and (ii) the scale of the economy. Government expenditure has a small but
signicant positive eect on net foreign assets in the second sub-sample. An increase
in government spending could be accompanied by an increase in the general level
of taxation, which leads to a decrease of the return to capital in the home country.
Public debt has no signicant inuence.
As expected, the wealth to output ratio has a positive eect on net foreign
assets. An increase in wealth has therefore a stronger eect on net foreign assets
than on capital. GDP per capita has no signicant impact, whereas population has a
signicant negative impact in the total sample. Population might therefore capture
part of the eect that the Solow model would attribute to population growth. Since
we consider a xed-eects regression, the negative eect cannot be attributed to a
15scale-eect.
To summarize, the time series evidence is in line with the predictions of the Solow
model. We interpret the positive eect of the savings rate, the negative coecient of
population growth and the coecient of the lagged dependent variable as evidence
of decreasing returns to capital.
4 Cross Country Evidence
To what extent can the Solow model explain actual cross country variation of net
investment positions? In other words, we want to investigate whether net foreign
assets are higher in countries with higher saving rates and lower in countries with
higher values of population and productivity growth. We rst test the basic speci-
cation and then discuss the robustness of the results with respect to other exogenous
variables and included countries.
4.1 Basic Specication
We use the same dataset as above. It contains observations for 21 industrialized
countries. Switzerland was identied as an outlier and is therefore excluded in most
specications.5 For most countries, data are available from 1966 to 1997. In order
to account for potential improvements of capital mobility over this time period, we
consider not only the whole sample period, but also every decade separately starting
with the 1970's.






= a0 + a1(sj   s) + a2(gj   g) + "j; (4.1)
5Introduction of Switzerland would support the Solow model even more, i.e. the coecients
gain substantially in size and signicance.
16where " is a country-specic shock and gj = (gL
j ;gA
j ), g = (gL;gA) are the same
vector as above, containing the population growth rate gL
j and the productivity
growth rate gA
j .
Since data on productivity growth are not available for some time periods and
some countries, we consider also the specication with population growth only. In
the 1970's data on productivity growth are only available for 14 countries due to
missing employment data in the OECD Labour Force Statistics. In the other decades
data are available for all countries, however not necessarily for all years.
We take averages (within the respective time period) of the explanatory variables.
As endogenous variable we choose again the ratio of net foreign assets to capital,
since it allows to assess whether net foreign assets increase more strongly than capital
in response to variations in the explanatory variables. We consider both the average
value and the value in the last year of the sample period. If country portfolios have
not yet reached steady state values, the coecients should be higher at the end of
the sample period6.
Table 2 reports the results of the basic specications. The rst two columns
correspond to the specication with population growth only. We nd that the pop-
ulation growth rate has a negative eect on F
K, highly signicant in most of the time
periods. In the 1990's the coecient is quantitatively close to the value predicted by
the Solow model. Assuming that world population growth is constant, equations 2.5
and 2.4 on page 6 imply that the long run coecient of population growth on net for-
eign assets is 1
sjk 1  g. Using standard parameter values (i.e.  = 0:33;K=Y = 3
and the average savings rate s  0:25) to calibrate the (average) value one obtains
a theoretical value for the coecient of -18. The empirical estimates are -9 for the
whole sample period, and -17 for the 1990's.
The savings rate has a positive impact on F
K. In other words, the savings rate






















Coef. St.E. Coef. St.E. Coef. St.E. Coef. St.E.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1966-1997
sj   s 0.36 0.29 0.56 0.38 0.49 0.29 0.60 0.40
gL
j   gL -9.76 3.93 -11.8 4.37 -12.59 4.77 -10.72 4.87
gA
j   gA -2.74 1.38 1.32 2.36
R2 0.33 0.33 0.38 0.37
Obs. 20 20 20 20
1970-1979
sj   s 0.09 0.23 0.33 0.25 0.34 0.39 0.25 0.39
gL
j   gL -7.01 3.23 -7.49 3.68 -7.20 4.05 -7.44 3.99
gA
j   gA -4.87 3.59 -1.09 2.02
R2 0.28 0.36 0.36 0.30
Obs. 20 20 14 14
1980-1989
sj   s 0.50 0.35 0.47 0.37 0.24 0.36 0.47 0.38
gL
j   gL -6.73 4.95 -9.95 5.25 -5.14 5.48 -8.28 5.79
gA
j   gA -1.18 1.60 1.82 2.48
R2 0.17 0.22 0.09 0.25
Obs. 20 20 20 20
1990-1997
sj   s 0.62 0.29 0.85 0.30 0.50 0.27 0.90 0.30
gL
j   gL -16.71 4.39 -16.13 4.92 -17.38 3.90 -16.7 4.90
gA
j   gA -1.72 0.91 -1.45 1.25
R2 0.52 0.50 0.61 0.54
Obs. 20 20 20 20
Table 2: Baseline results. Cross country regression for 20 countries. The explana-
tory variables are the country averages of the respective time period.
18has a stronger impact on net foreign assets than on capital. The coecient is small
and not signicant in the 1970's. It increases for later time periods and also gains
in signicance. In the 1990's one obtains a value of 0.6. It is still much smaller
than predicted by the Solow model, but highly signicant. Moreover, if one uses
the stock of net foreign assets at the end of the period (instead of the average one)
as an endogenous variable, the coecients are higher and more signicant. The
explanatory power of the regressors is substantial. The R2 of the regressions for the
whole sample period is 35%, but goes up to 50% for the regressions in the 1990's.
The last two columns of Table 2 report the results of the regressions including
productivity growth. The coecients of the saving rates and population growth
remain basically unchanged. Productivity growth has the expected sign though
insignicant in most of the specications. In column three, with average net foreign
assets as endogenous variable, productivity growth is signicant at the 10 % level
for the total sample period and for the 1990's.
The contribution of productivity growth to overall explanatory power of the
model is limited. Still, in the 1990's, the R2 increases up to 61%. Note that the
R2 in column 3 might be lower than in column 1 since the underlying data are not
necessarily the same due to missing productivity data.
To summarize, the Solow model provides a remarkably good description of the
composition of country portfolios in the 1990's. The fact that it increases its pre-
dictive power over time is in line with the fact that capital markets were liberalized
in the beginnings of the 1990's.
4.2 Robustness
We check the robustness of the results along three dimensions. First, we include more
variables that are potentially important in explaining country portfolios. Second,
we look more in detail at the countries included in our dataset. Finally, we briey
19discuss the results if a dierent dataset on net foreign asset positions is used.
4.2.1 Variables
In Table 3, we include ten more variables as explanatory variables. Since we have
only 20 country observations we do not include all variables at once but in dierent
blocks. The rst block investigates the role of human capital growth. The remain-
ing blocks consider variables that have been stressed by either Kraay et al. (2000)
or Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001b). Including them in the regression allows to
asses their explanatory power once one controls for the savings rate and population
growth.
4.2.1.1 Human capital growth Exogenous productivity growth plays a crucial
role in the Solow model. We therefore test the robustness with respect to another
variable that could capture productivity growth. We include the growth rate of
average years of schooling as reported by de la Fuente and Domenech (2001). It
turns out to be insignicant in all regressions. The coecients on savings and
population growth change only slightly compared to the baseline specication.
4.2.1.2 Scale Variables In the second block, we introduce variables that are
related to the size of the economy. Small economies are likely to have high foreign
asset positions in order to compensate a lack of diversication possibilities in their
own countries. As for GDP, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001b) argue that it is the
principal determinant of the net foreign asset positions. In addition to population
and GDP per capita, we include the level of average years of schooling as a proxy
for the eciency units of labor.
Whereas the coecients on GDP per capita and years of schooling are insignif-

















Coef. St.E. Coef. St.E. Coef. St.E. Coef. St.E. Coef. St.E. Coef. St.E. Coef. St.E. Coef. St.E.
1966-1997 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1997
1 sj   s 0.35 0.3 0.54 0.4 0.01 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.49 0.36 0.44 0.37 0.54 0.3 0.85 0.31
gL
j   gL -9.18 4.35 -11.75 4.51 -7.85 3.39 -8.16 3.86 -5.57 5.38 -8.25 5.56 -18.67 4.84 -16.97 5.54
HK growth 0.32 0.9 0.24 1.17 0.64 0.72 0.51 0.72 0.49 0.79 0.77 0.81 -0.53 0.51 -0.19 0.52
R2 0.34 0.36 0.31 0.37 0.19 0.26 0.54 0.51
Obs. 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
2 sj   s 0.35 0.27 0.50 0.46 0.03 0.20 0.23 0.19 0.36 0.32 0.57 0.4 0.58 0.4 0.85 0.43
gL
j   gL -11.03 3.78 -12.57 5.08 -7.67 2.84 -7.23 2.85 -9.76 4.57 -12.35 5.34 -19.96 6.07 -15.53 6.91
ln(gdp=L) -0.02 0.11 0.04 0.16 0.006 0.086 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.11 -0.05 0.13 -0.01 0.15 0.06 0.16
School. 0.004 0.014 -0.002 0.021 -0.006 0.011 -0.008 0.011 -0.004 0.015 -0.006 0.018 0.014 0.019 -0.004 0.021
ln(L) 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
R2 0.64 0.43 0.59 0.70 0.62 0.53 0.54 0.51
Obs. 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
3 ln A
L 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.13 0.05
R2 0.18 0.10 0.10 0.22 0.35 0.14 0.28 0.26
Obs. 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
ln A
Y 0.21 0.08 0.24 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.16 0.08 0.26 0.07 0.28 0.09 0.22 0.07 0.21 0.08
ln Y
L 0.01 0.06 -0.02 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.08
R2 0.31 0.24 0.14 0.26 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.34
Obs. 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
sj   s -0.17 0.44 0.00 0.78 0.30 0.86 0.15 0.85 -0.56 0.58 -0.24 0.51 0.23 0.40 0.88 0.48
gL
j   gL -10.22 5.50 -9.53 6.44 -6.92 5.41 -6.89 5.13 -5.49 4.92 -4.24 6.38 -21.37 5.62 -21.92 8.00
gA
j   gA -1.64 1.41 1.42 2.44 -5.16 4.55 -1.45 2.65 -0.90 1.23 1.58 2.32 -1.66 0.99 -1.67 1.51
ln A
Y 0.18 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.18 0.27 0.09 0.27 0.12 -0.03 0.10 -0.07 0.12
ln Y
L 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.15 0.04 0.17 0.11 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.10 0.09
R2 0.53 0.41 0.37 0.32 0.53 0.44 0.70 0.58
Obs. 20 20 14 14 20 20 20 20
4 sj   s 0.06 0.39 0.60 0.48 -0.14 0.33 0.02 0.38 0.05 0.36 0.15 0.44 0.51 0.31 0.80 0.33
gL
j   gL -12.25 9.89 -25.25 8.22 0.53 6.81 -7.47 9.11 -6.41 7.02 -9.9 8.23 -25.61 8.05 -29.83 11.23
2(demog) 2.11 0.55 4.81 0.19 4.03 0.26 1.86 0.6 8.6 0.04 3.19 0.36 4.65 0.19 3.73 0.29
R2 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.46 0.34 0.61 0.59
Obs. 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
5 sj   s 0.37 0.35 0.74 0.37 0.18 0.29 0.43 0.3 0.39 0.42 0.58 0.45 0.68 0.34 0.94 0.33
gL
j   gL -11.19 4.86 -10.12 4.11 -5.85 3.62 -7.71 4.03 -7.52 5.41 -9.58 5.87 -16.26 4.81 -14.59 5.25
pubDebt
Y 0.02 0.1 0.14 0.11 -0.04 0.11 0.05 0.1 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.07
G
Y 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.004 -0.002 -0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.005
R2 0.34 0.43 0.26 0.41 0.19 0.24 0.53 0.51
Obs. 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Table 3: Predicting Power of other explanatory variables.
2
1small - in the 1970's and 1980's. In the 1990's, however, GDP per capita is insignif-
icant as well. The coecients on savings and population growth remain unchanged.
4.2.1.3 Wealth The third block of regressions investigates the role of wealth
in explaining net foreign asset positions. We follow Kraay et al. (2000) who argue
that wealth per capita is the most relevant explanatory variable. In another set of
regressions we decompose the eect into the wealth to output ratio and output per
capita. Finally, we include the latter two variables in the regressions with savings,
population and productivity growth.
In all time periods, wealth per capita has a signicant positive impact. The
size of the coecient is slightly higher but similar to the estimates of Kraay et al.
(2000), although we restrict ourselves to industrialized countries only. The second
set of regressions reveals that the positive impact of wealth per capita can be fully















and nd that GDP per capita has no impact on net foreign assets. In contrast,
the wealth to output ratio is signicant in almost all regressions. What matters
is therefore not wealth per capita, as argued in Kraay et al. (2000), nor GDP per
capita (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001b), but the ratio of the two.
This result could be interpreted as conrming the Solow model which predicts a
strong positive correlation between the wealth to output ratio and the ratio of net
foreign assets and capital. A model without decreasing returns, e.g. the AK-model,
does not predict any relation between the wealth to output ratio and net foreign
assets. This nding could therefore be seen as further evidence for decreasing returns
to capital. Note that the wealth to output ratio is not a measure of wealth. In the
1990's, the United States had an average wealth to output ratio of 2.17 which was
well below average, roughly at the same level as Portugal. In contrast, Japan had a
level of GDP per capita that was close to the one of the U.S., but had a wealth to
output ratio of 5.
22Including our standard explanatory variables (savings, population growth and
productivity growth) and A
Y in one regression suers from the fact that the wealth
to output ratio itself is strongly correlated with savings and exogenous growth rates.
Given the relatively small sample size of 20 cross country observations, it is unlikely
that the eects can be clearly separated. It turns out the most of the coecients
are insignicant and much smaller than if the variables are included separately.
In some time periods, A
Y captures most of the eect resulting in highly insignicant
coecients for savings. In the 1990's, however, savings and population growth seems
to capture most of the eect and the wealth to output ratio is insignicant.
4.2.1.4 Demographic Variables Demographic factors are potentially impor-
tant determinants of international investment positions. The most important chan-
nel through which the age structure may inuence investment positions is its impact
on savings. A relatively young workforce may point to low savings and high invest-
ment, whereas an older workforce may be associated with high savings for retirement
motives. Savings might be low if there are many retirees that actually dissave. If
this was the only channel, one should not expect nding a signicant impact of
demographic factors once the savings rate is included.
However, there are more potentially important channels. First, risk aversion is
likely to change as people grow older and richer. Second a high youth dependency
ratio may require heavy investment in social infrastructure as education and housing.
Finally, to the extent that capital markets are not perfect, young entrepreneurs might
be forced to nance their projects with own savings, which would lead to natural
co-movement of savings with investments.
Following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001b), we construct three composite vari-
ables that reect the demographic structure. They are based on United Nations
data on population shares for 12 age cohorts and summarize the entire age distribu-
23tion in a parsimonious way7. In the last but one block of regressions in table 3 we
report the 2 statistics (and the associated p value) of a likelihood ratio test that
the three demographic variables are jointly signicant.
Although the demographic variables are signicant in only one of the regressions
(1980-1989), they reduce the coecient on savings in some of the regressions. This
however, is not surprising to the extent that the demographic structure is an im-
portant determinant of a country's aggregate savings behavior. In the 1990's, the
savings rate is signicant and has roughly the same magnitude as in the benchmark
regressions. Population growth is signicant throughout all the regressions, such
that we take this evidence as further conrmation of the Solow model.
4.2.1.5 Fiscal Policy International investment positions might nally depend
on scal policy. The rst variable we consider is the stock of public debt. Public
debt is dened as the sum of external public debt, net of foreign-exchange reserves,
and gross domestic public debt.8 An increase in public debt will not be oset by
an increase in private savings whenever the Ricardian equivalence does not hold.
In that case, higher levels of public debt may be associated with a decline in the
external position. A second variable that could capture basically the same eect is
government spending. Moreover, government spending could be a measure of public
infrastructure that increases the return to capital.
The last block of regressions in Table 3 shows, that neither of the variables is
signicant. The coecients on savings and population growth remain in their usual
range. In terms of explanatory power, scal policy does not seem to add a signicant
amount.
7See the appendix in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001b), page 114, for details on the construction
of the variables.
8The data on public debt were constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001b). I thank the
authors for kindly sharing their data. Their original source of data for public debt is the OECD
(central government denition).
244.2.1.6 Summary Controlling for additional variables does not alter the main
conclusion, that the Solow model provides a good description of the data. Finding
insignicant coecients in the reported regressions, however, does not imply that
the respective variables do not inuence investment positions. It implies, that the
only channel through which they might aect the investment positions, is via the
savings rate.
4.2.2 Countries
In order to understand the results of this paper relative to the literature, it is inter-
esting to extend the sensitivity analysis to the countries included in the empirical
analysis. In particular, a strict interpretation of the "new rule", proposed by Kraay
and Ventura (2000), would imply that the ratio of net foreign assets to wealth or
capital does not depend on the savings rate. If the marginal unit of wealth - gener-
ated e.g. through an increase in savings - is invested in foreign assets to the same
extent that existing wealth is invested in foreign assets the composition of a coun-
try's portfolio does not change. In our specications above, however, we nd direct
evidence for a positive eect of savings on the composition of a country's portfolio.
We therefore have a closer look at the countries that Kraay and Ventura include
in their empirical analysis. In Table 4 we report the baseline results for the last
time period, i.e. 1990 to 1997 for three sub-samples. First we consider the total
dataset (including Switzerland), the 13 countries used by Kraay and Ventura and the
remaining countries. We also report the results for the regressions with TFP-growth.
The results show that the negative relationship between population growth and
net foreign assets is robust. The coecient on savings, is not signicantly dierent
from zero for the 13 countries considered by Kraay and Ventura. In the remaining
sample, however, the impact of savings is large and highly signicant. Figure 2
visualized this nding by plotting the bivariate relationship between savings (relative
to the world average) and net foreign assets.
25Regressions Endogenous variable: NFA
Capital in 1996
All countries "New rule" Remaining
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
sj   s 1.04 0.4 0.38 0.52 1.51 0.72
gL
j   gL -14.58 6.62 -10.96 6.38 -24.97 14.91
R2 0.36 0.29 0.52
Obs. 21 13 8
sj   s 1.09 0.38 -0.14 0.44 2.12 0.62
gL
j   gL -15.94 6.29 -12.43 4.9 -34.96 12.44
gA
j   gA -2.77 1.53 -3.97 1.39 -5.92 2.82
R2 0.47 0.63 0.77
Obs. 21 13 8
Descriptive statistics: Standard deviations
f
k (1996) 0.12 0.07 0.17
sj   s 0.05 0.04 0.08
gL
j   gL 0.003 0.003 0.004
gA
j   gA 0.014 0.012 0.016
Table 4: The eect of savings and population growth depending on the in-
cluded countries. The rst columns correspond to the total dataset,
including Switzerland. The second columns report the results for
the 13 countries that have been included in the empirical analysis
in Kraay and Ventura (2000). The last columns correspond to the
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Data: Penn World Tables (2002) and Kraay et al. (2000) 
Net foreign assets and savings rates
Figure 2: Bivariate relation between the ratio of NFA over capital in 1996
and the average savings rate between 1990 and 1997. The bold
labelled countries are not used in the empirical analysis of Kraay
and Ventura (2000).
26A possible explanation for this nding lies in the size of the gross country vari-
ation of the respective variables. The second part of Table 4 documents that the
standard deviations of net foreign assets in 1996 and the savings rate is much smaller
in Kraay and Ventura's dataset than in the remaining countries. The standard de-
viations of the savings rate are 4 versus 8 percentage points, respectively.
We therefore think that the insignicant coecient on savings in the rst sub-
sample should not be taken as evidence against the Solow model. There are many
factors that aect the return to capital, such as taxation, labor market institutions,
competition policy and so on, that might cloud the eect on capital accumulation
on the return to capital. As soon as the variation of savings becomes large enough,
the eect becomes visible.
4.2.3 Data
A further way of testing the robustness would be the use of a dierent dataset.
Using the dataset of Kraay et al. (2000) has the advantage that the authors provide
coherent data not only on net foreign assets but also on nancial wealth and capital.
This allows us to "normalize" the stock of net foreign assets over capital, which is
a stock variable itself. The dataset of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a) contains as
measure of international investment positions the fraction of net foreign assets in
output. Using this measure as endogenous variable, the results are quantitatively
and qualitatively the same for both dataset. Moreover, they are completely coherent
with the results reported here, i.e. the sign of the coecients is identical and the
magnitude is roughly scaled by the capital to output ratio (factor 3).
5 Gross investment positions
The question arises whether introduction of small but nonzero country specic pro-
duction risk, i.e. production risk that cannot be diversied among the large number
27of rms within every country, would lead to completely unrealistic predictions for
gross stocks of international investment positions, and whether this feature would
render the model implications for net positions worthless.
Country specic production risk together with transaction cost of capital move-
ments determine the desire of agents for international risk sharing. If transaction
costs are small compared to the production risk, complete risk sharing will be opti-
mal. One way to implement the rst best allocation (subject to the constraint that
the savings rates are exogenous) is to have representative agents that completely
diversify their portfolios. This, however, would be in contrast to well known empir-
ical evidence that country portfolios are heavily biased towards investments in the
home country.
Assuming that transaction cost are high will avoid unrealistic predictions for
gross capital ows. However, high transaction costs will also restrict the possibilities
of net capital ows to equilibrate dierences in the return to capital, that are at the
heart of the open-economy Solow model. The only way to establish that capital does
indeed ow to the location where returns are highest, but gross ows are small, is
to assume that both transaction costs and gains from diversication are very small,
but transaction costs are still larger than gains from portfolio diversication.
The evidence on the gains from global risksharing is mixed. An empirical paper
that nds rather large values is Athanasoulis and Wincoop (2000). For a sample of
21 OECD countries they nd a gain of 1.5%, corresponding to a welfare equivalent
increase in consumption. In contrast, Cole and Obstfeld (1991) argue that the
gains are small. The authors calibrate a general equilibrium model with output
uncertainty and nd social gains from international risk sharing to be in the order
of 0.2 % of output per year. A crucial mechanism underlying their results is the eect
of output uncertainty on the relative prices at which international commodity trade
occurs. Since a country's terms of trade are negatively correlated with growth in
its export sector, commodity trade plays an important role in automatically pooling
28national output risks.
6 Conclusion
Most countries are either persistent international net creditors or international net
debtors. This observation raises the question of what are the determinants of a
country's long run portfolio composition.
In this paper we analyze to what extent international investment positions can be
explained by an open-economy Solow model. We nd that in the 1990's, dierences
in the savings rates and the population growth rates can explain more than half
of the cross country variation of net foreign assets. A dynamic panel estimation
shows that Solow model also provides a good description of the time series behavior
of NFA. The overall impact of savings on the composition of country portfolios is
smaller than predicted by the model. This however might be due to the relative short
sample period together with a very slow speed of convergence. In fact, the model
calibrated with standard parameters used e.g. by Mankiw et al. (1992) predicts
that the net foreign asset positions approach their steady state level with a half-life
period of 17 years.
29A Aggregation in the Simple Solow Model
The world average capital intensity is k = K
H with K =
N P
j=0





















Both s and g increase over time. The average savings rate s approaches a constant as
soon as the world economy approaches constant ratios of net foreign asset positions
over GDP. The growth rate g converges to the growth rate of the fastest growing
country in the very long run since all other countries become vanishingly small.
Since we can observe the world average growth rate in the data, we typically
treat it as exogenous variable. This implies that we make the assumption that we
consider a small country j whose growth rate has negligible inuence on the world
average. Additionally, we consider a relatively short time period for which even the
fastest growing small economy remains small.
























= sy   ( + g)k; (A.3)
using equations A.1 and A.2 together with
P
j Fj = 0, yj = y and kj = k. Equa-
tion A.3 corresponds to equation 2.4 in the main part of the paper.
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